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University Faculty of Law.  I am grateful to David Sloss and the student organizers of the 
symposium for having invited me to participate in a provocative and enjoyable event. 
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Roger Alford has given us a thought-provoking and timely examination of the 
interplay between the trade and investment regimes, and particularly of the interplay in 
dispute settlement. His insightful observations go well beyond the usual bow to historical 
differences that, as a result of path-dependence, have led to the establishment of two 
regimes that diverge in multiple ways. Rather, he focuses on aspects of convergence and 
cross-fertilization between the two regimes and their mutually reinforcing nature. Both 
regimes have grown significantly since the WTO was established in 1995, and one might 
expect them to consolidate their respective positions of strength in the coming years. Yet 
one also can expect continued competition and divergence between the two sectors. 
Ideally, and perhaps idealistically, one might see the development of complementary 
regimes such that each works to provide redress for the matters that it is most suited to 
handle. 
My comments below generally follow the organizational layout of Professor Alford’s 
paper. First, I address some potential effects of the incorporation of investment 
agreements in preferential trading agreements (PTAs). Second, I consider the areas 
where the trade and investment regimes converge with respect to obligations. Third, I 
consider various implications of parallel proceedings that straddle the trade and 
investment regimes. Fourth, I consider cross-regime enforcement of rights and of 
remedies. 
I. PTAs 
Linking investment and trade obligations, as is done in PTAs, has some potential to 
minimize concerns that investment protections are asymmetrical obligations that require 
a great deal of states that are hosting investments from foreign investors but require 
nothing of the investors themselves or of the investors’ home states. The classic example 
of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) is an agreement between a capital-exporting state 
and a capital-importing state. BITs usually do not include a commitment to enhance the 
flow of capital between two countries; rather the hope is that a state will be more likely to 
attract foreign investors if it accords the investors certain protections.1  States that are 
home to the investors gain by negotiating treaties that protect their investors.2 This 
paradigm is shifting slightly as more BITs are negotiated between countries at similar 
levels of development and as traditional capital-importing states begin investing abroad. 
 
1. The literature is mixed about whether BITs actually increase investment.  See generally KARL P. 
SAUVANT & LISA E. SACHS, THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS 
(2009); Peter Egger & Valeria Merlo, BITs Bite: An Anatomy of the Impact of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties on Multinational Firms, 114 SCANDINAVIAN J. ECON. 1240 (2012). 
2. By negotiating investment treaties, home states give their investors more autonomy of action.  
The investors can submit claims of investment treaty violations directly against host states.  Their 
ability to submit those claims also gives investors more leverage with respect to settlement.   
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Nonetheless, BITs tend to emphasize the protection of investors and their investments, 
and do not cover the broad array of matters that trade agreements address.  
 PTAs tend to reflect and to encourage the formation of deeper ties between 
governments and between governments and investors, so that each treaty partner has 
more to lose in the event of a rift. Professor Alford gives an excellent explanation of the 
potential for PTAs to facilitate the establishment of global supply chains that facilitate 
the establishment of manufacturing facilities across a number of countries.3 Given the 
breadth of coverage of most PTAs, there are more opportunities for reciprocal gains in the 
negotiation of the treaty and in its implementation; for example, states that permit the 
establishment of manufacturing facilities within their borders might in turn negotiate 
preferential tariff treatment for goods they export. Sovereigns thus have more incentive 
to solve their disputes diplomatically in order to preserve the deep and broad trading 
relationship.   
Yet even with respect to PTAs, when disputes arise between Member States, 
disparities in bargaining power inevitably manifest themselves. For example, Mexico and 
the United States have had long-running disputes over access by Mexican companies to 
the U.S. market in the sugar and trucking services sectors. Mexico retaliated against the 
United States’ refusal to open its market to Mexican sugar by imposing high taxes on the 
use of high-fructose corn syrup, which in turn led to multiple adversarial proceedings 
between the two countries in multiple fora. While Mexico tried to force the United States 
to comply with its North American Free Trade Agreement obligations,  the United States 
disputed that it had agreed to open its market to Mexican sugar imports.4 The two 
countries finally came to an agreement in July 2006.5 Prior to the sugar dispute, Mexico 
had also won a Chapter XX dispute with the United States in the trucking case in 2001,6 
though Mexican trucks have only recently been granted access to the U.S. market 
pursuant to a pilot program launched by the Department of Transportation’s Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety Administration that permits Mexican-domiciled long-haul carriers 
to qualify to operate in the United States for up to three years.7 One might say that 
 
3. Roger Alford, The Convergence of International Trade and Investment Arbitration, 12 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 35 (2013).  
4. See, e.g., Alford, supra note 3, at 35; see also Sergio Puig, Investor-State Tribunals and 
Constitutional Courts: The Mexican Sweeteners Saga, 5 MEXICAN L. REV. 199, 222-33 (2012) 
(providing a comprehensive analysis of the negotiations of Chapter 11 and the sweeteners 
conflict between Mexico and the United States).  
5. Magda Kornis, U.S. Corn Sweeteners and Mexican Sugar: Agreement at Last!, 1 J. INT’L 
COM. & ECON. 51, 59-60 (Dec. 2006). 
6. In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services (U.S.-Mex.), Secretariat File No. USA-MEX-98-
2008-01, Final Report of the Panel, at ¶1, ¶¶ 291-92, ¶ 294-95, ¶ 297, ¶ 299 (NAFTA Arb. Panel 
Feb. 6, 2001). 
7. U.S.-Mexico Cross-Border Trucking Pilot Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/intl-programs/trucking/Trucking-Program.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 
2013).   
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precisely because the economies of Mexico and the United States are so linked, Mexico 
has been forced to bargain in the shadow of NAFTA and has had difficulty forcing the 
United States to abide by its obligations. Yet it is also true that in each of these cases 
diplomacy, bolstered by dispute settlement procedures, has resulted in a solution.  
II.  Convergence of Norms 
Given the different goals and scope of coverage of PTAs and BITs, the different 
substantive obligations in the agreements overlap only in limited ways. Certainly, 
national treatment – non-discrimination on the basis of nationality – is the most evident 
common obligation.8  I share Professor Alford’s skepticism about the utility of comparing 
like products in the WTO/GATT context with “like circumstances” as usually used in the 
investment context; unlike him, I am more optimistic that tribunals have generally 
rejected the analogy. 
 Initially investor-state tribunals, particularly those convened under NAFTA, 
encouraged by analogies and arguments made by counsel, relied on GATT/WTO 
jurisprudence in their rulings.9  Yet after the first few years, investment tribunals have 
been much less inclined to look to WTO jurisprudence, and have even expressed 
skepticism about its relevance.  This quote from the Methanex case (written in 2005), in 
which the tribunal rejected the argument that GATT’s treatment of “like goods” was 
relevant to the determination of whether two entities were in “like circumstances,” as 
required by NAFTA Article 1102, is illustrative:  
The issue here is not the relevance of general international law, as the late Sir 
Robert Jennings proposed on behalf of Methanex, or the theoretical possibility of 
construing a provision of NAFTA by reference to another treaty of the parties, for 
example the GATT.  International law directs this Tribunal, first and foremost, to 
the text; here, the text and the drafters’ intention, which it manifests, show that 
trade provisions were not to be transported to investment provisions.  Accordingly, 
the Tribunal holds that Article 1102 is to be read on its own terms and not as if the 
words “any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods” appeared in it.10 
NAFTA requires equality of treatment of investors, and investments of investors, that 
are in like circumstances.11  Not all investment treaties have the same formulation, and 
 
8. Alford, supra note 3, at 41.  
9. MEG KINNEAR, ANDREA K. BJORKLUND, & JOHN F.G. HANNAFORD, INVESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER 
NAFTA: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA, CHAPTER 11 §1102.12-1102.17.1 (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
10. Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, UNCITRAL, Final Award of the Tribunal on 
Jurisdiction and Merits (Aug. 3, 2005).   
11. NAFTA Article 1102 provides:   
1.  Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with 
respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, 
operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. 
2.  Each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment 
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some contain no reference to the word “like” at all, though most commentators agree that 
some comparative exercise must be undertaken, regardless of the words of the treaty.12  
Particularly when there is a direction to look at the circumstances surrounding the 
investments, rather than at the investments themselves, a departure from the GATT’s 
focus on like products is warranted and it is reasonable to treat “like products” in the 
GATT context as lex specialis and of little relevance to most cases brought under 
investment treaties.13  Yet the effect of that rejection is not always certain. The question 
of whether investors, or their investments, are like each other can lead to both broader 
and narrower assessments of what is “like” than a straightforward like, or even a directly 
competitive or substitutable, product analysis would.14   
Professor Alford also refers to an investment tribunal’s reliance on GATT Article XX’s 
treatment of the word “necessary” when that tribunal was construing the meaning of 
“necessary” in the context of the essential security provision in the Argentina–United 
States BIT.15  I have expressed my skepticism about this particular cross-fertilization 
due to the excision of the word “necessary” in the body of GATT Article XX from the 
protective mechanism of the chapeau.16  In WTO jurisprudence the two sections work 
together, with panels and the appellate body showing a fair amount of deference to 
member states in their determination of what measures are “necessary” to protect 
human, animal, or plant life or health, with scrutiny under the chapeau ensuring a last 
“check” on whether or not the measure taken was done for bona fide reasons.  The 
investment tribunal borrowed from the “necessary” jurisprudence developed by the WTO 
appellate body without also importing its context – the protective chapeau.  This 
arguably resulted in a deferential view of what the respondent state viewed as 
“necessary” without considering whether the measure constituted arbitrary or 
discriminatory treatment or a disguised restriction on trade (or, given the different 
context, investment).  
 
no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of 
its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, 
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. 
  North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 19, 1992, 32 I.L.M 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
12. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, National Treatment, in STANDARDS OF  INVESTMENT PROTECTION 29, 29-
48 (August Reinisch ed., 2008). 
13. One could imagine a case where the investment is in the manufacture of goods competing with 
those produced by a local company where the issue of like, or directly competitive or substitutable, 
products would be relevant. 
14. KINNEAR ET AL., supra note 9, §1102.40b – 1102.40c.  
15. Alford, supra note 3, at 55 & n.114. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 182-88 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
16. Andrea K. Bjorklund & Sophie Nappert, Beyond Fragmentation, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:  IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WÄLDE 466, 466-479 (Todd Weiler & 
Freya Baetens eds., 2011). 
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III.  Parallel Proceedings 
The question of parallel proceedings raises a fascinating cluster of issues illustrative 
of the convergence in trade and investment and the complementarity between the 
different regimes.17  One thing is clear: investors will leave no stone unturned in seeking 
relief when they view themselves as injured by state conduct. 
Investors have every incentive to seek relief in multiple fora due to the differing 
nature of the remedies available.  Investment law tends to give retrospective relief in the 
form of money damages enforceable under the New York or ICSID Conventions.18  In the 
WTO the primary remedy is prospective relief in the form of removal of the offending 
measure with retaliation for non-compliance possible in the form of suspension of 
concessions or compensation by way of compensating tariff reductions (ordinarily a 
complainant is not entitled to monetary compensation).19 These differences mean that 
relief received will often be complementary,20 yet one can imagine cases in which there is 
overlap.  To take one example, relief for an expropriation requires the assessment of the 
fair market value of the property taken.  In the case of a “going concern,” this calculation 
would encompass future profits so long as they could be proved with reasonable 
certainty.  If the measure were rescinded, should not the monies payable to compensate 
for lost future earnings be eliminated from the damages award?  In short, 
 
17. One issue of increasing interest is the nature of the rights enjoyed by investors and how those 
overlap with states.  Several years ago I wrote a paper outlining some of the problems that one 
could anticipate given the unclear nature of the rights enjoyed by investors and the unclear 
relationship between investors and their home states.  Andrea K. Bjorklund, Private Rights and 
Public International Law: Why Competition Between International Courts and Tribunals Is Not 
Working, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 241 (2007).  Those issues are even more cogent now as it seems states 
are asserting themselves into the investment dispute realm.  Recently Ecuador sought to initiate 
dispute settlement against the United States under the state-state article of the Ecuador-United 
States BIT.  The tribunal found that it lacked jurisdiction.  Luke Eric Peterson, US-Ecuador Inter-
State Investment Treaty Award Released to Parties; Tribunal Members Part Ways on Key Issues, 5 
INVESTMENT ARB. REP., no. 21 (Nov. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20121030_1 (article available through subscription or 
purchase). A more sustained exploration of those issues is warranted, but is beyond the scope of 
this short comment. 
18. Successful enforcement is sometimes more difficult than is apparent on the surface, given the 
execution immunity enjoyed by many state-owned assets.  See Andrea K. Bjorklund, State 
Immunity and the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CHRISTOPH SCHREUER 302 
(Christina Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch & Stephan Wittich eds., 2009). 
19. Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 22.4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.  See also John Jackson, Editorial 
Comment, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement Reports: Obligation to Comply or 
Option to “Buy Out”?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 109 (2004); Alan O. Sykes, Public versus Private 
Enforcement of International Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 637 
(2005). 
20. See Alford, supra note 3, at 47 (describing relief received by the United States and by US investors 
from Mexico for Mexico’s imposition of the taxes on HFCS). 
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notwithstanding divergence there is the possibility of overlap and the need for tribunals 
to take each other’s decisions into account. 
Should parallel proceedings exist at all?  It is easy when comparing the WTO 
Agreements and investment treaties to see differences in remedies and in claimants and 
to minimize concerns of overlap.  But multiple proceedings place a great deal of pressure 
against one defendant.  In private law cases concerns about parallel proceedings arise 
because of their vexatious or harassing nature.  There are also concerns about 
inconsistent decisions, a problem that has bedeviled investment arbitration as well.21  
Yet refusing to allow parallel proceedings merely because different tribunals might come 
to different decisions, thus triggering difficulties in reconciling them, seems to avoid one 
problem – designing a regime to accommodate competing decisions – by creating others, 
including the potential for one tribunal to exercise jurisdiction when another might be 
better situated to hear the case,  or to decide a case incorrectly without the salutary effect 
of another tribunal’s decision requiring a reassessment of the first award.  That trade-off 
might be worthwhile if one’s goal is to create a unified regime in which all tribunals 
abide by the same rules, in which there is a good deal of similarity in the law applied by 
various tribunals, and in which there is a central control mechanism in place to ensure 
that each tribunal abides by its obligations.  The European Union countries have created 
such a regime, initially via the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and now through EU Regulation 44/2001,22 
supervised by the Court of Justice of the European Communities. Under the Brussels 
Regulation, the court first seised of a matter has priority and other tribunals must give 
way.23  The Regulation also has elaborate rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the courts subject to its authority.24  
If or when some regime similar to the Brussels Convention could be created across the 
differing regimes found in international law (or even in international economic law), 
barring parallel proceedings might be sensible.  As it stands, however, it is much more 
likely that we will continue to face a fragmented regime in which different actors (e.g. 
investors and states) can invoke different laws (e.g. BIT obligations or WTO obligations 
or Law of the Sea obligations) before different tribunals (e.g. ad hoc arbitral bodies or the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body).  States have created these multiple regimes with some 
 
21. See, e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Is Consistency a Myth?, in PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION 137 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds., 2008); see Susan D. Franck, The 
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law Through 
Inconsistent Decisions, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521 (2005).  
22. Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L12), available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:012:0001:0023:EN:PDF. 
23. Id. art. 27. 
24. Id. arts. 2-30. 
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overlap and some complementarity, and an attempt to minimize the former while 
enhancing the latter is the most beneficial course currently available.  
IV.  Cross-Regime Enforcement of Rights and Remedies 
The idea of using investment obligations to enforce trade obligations is not new – the 
claimants in some of the early NAFTA cases25 made some very creative arguments on the 
basis of NAFTA Article 1105, which promises treatment in accordance with international 
law.26  One of the arguments was that treatment in accordance with international law 
meant treatment in accordance with any international legal obligation binding as 
between Canada and the United States,  i.e., potentially extending to WTO obligations, 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the like.27  The arguments 
in those early cases were among the factors that led to the Note of Interpretation limiting 
Article 1105 to the minimum standard of treatment and stating that “A determination 
that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate 
international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 
1105(1).”28 This response demonstrates the unease of the NAFTA Parties at the 
possibility of cross-enforcement of norms.   
These arguments might be viewed as an early precursor to Professor Alford’s idea of 
using an “umbrella clause” to bring other obligations within the purview of an 
investment treaty tribunal.29  Umbrella clauses, also called “observance of undertakings” 
clauses, are treaty obligations in which a state promises to observe the undertakings it 
has given investors.30  These clauses are often invoked when a state has violated a 
contract with an investor; the umbrella clause can potentially “elevate” the contractual 
 
25. See, e.g.,  Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA Trib. Memorial of the Investor 
(Second Phase), ¶¶108-193 (Sept. 5, 2000), available at 
http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeInvestorSecondPhaseMemorial.pdf; S.D. 
Myers v. Government of Canada, NAFTA Trib. Partial Award, ¶261 (Nov. 13, 2000), available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0747.pdf; S.D. Myers v. Government 
of Canada, NAFTA Trib. Reply of the Investor Initial Phase, ¶ 100-115 (July 20, 1999), available 
at http://www.naftalaw.org/Disputes/Canada/SDMyers/SDMyersReply.pdf. 
26. KINNEAR ET AL., supra note 9, §1105.21-1105.27.  
27. Pope & Talbot, Inc., supra note 25, at ¶¶ 125, 190-93; see also KINNEAR ET AL., supra note 9, 
§1105.23-1105.24.  
28. NAFTA Free Trade Commission July 31, 2001 Notes of Interpretation on Access to Documents 
and Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT CANADA,  http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-
agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/nafta-interpr.aspx?lang=eng (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
29. Alford, supra note 3, at 55-60.  
30. See, e.g., KATIA YANNACA-SMALL, What About This “Umbrella Clause”?, in ARBITRATION UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS:  A GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 479,  483-85 (Katia 
Yannaca-Small ed., 2010). 
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breach to the level of a treaty breach.31 This idea is fascinating, but will almost certainly 
meet a great deal of resistance from states, as they are unlikely to view undertakings 
made in other treaties as falling within the scope of an umbrella clause.  Yet one can see 
that the argument is likely to be attractive to an investor with a private right of action 
under an investment treaty.  For example, the investor might want to challenge a 
measure that violates the WTO TRIMs (trade related investment measures) agreement.32  
Most investment treaties do not bar performance requirements – the U.S. treaties are an 
exception – so the investor would need to use the umbrella clause to bring an investment 
claim for a violation of the TRIMs agreement on the theory that abiding by TRIMs is an 
undertaking made to an investor’s investment.  I query the success of such a ploy – the 
TRIMs undertakings are made to the other WTO parties, not to investors themselves – 
but one can see the attraction of attempting to make the argument.   
Of course, in order for investors to decide it is worthwhile to seek “trade” remedies in 
the investment context, they must have the ability to obtain the remedies they receive.  
In fact, if investors are going to continue to seek relief under their investment treaties at 
all, they must be able to enforce the awards rendered in their favor.  The recent difficulty 
enforcing awards against Argentina, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Zimbabwe 
suggests that investors ought to have a lot more doubt about the desirability of 
submitting claims when resulting damages might be almost impossible to collect.33   
Inability to secure remedies within one regime makes the idea of cross-regime 
retaliation appealing, as Professor Alford notes.34  The United States’ revocation of 
generalized system of preferences (GSP) status for Argentina and reported interventions 
at the International Monetary Fund and the Paris Club suggest alternate avenues for 
relief exist,35 though I am concerned about the re-introduction of diplomatic protection 
and power politics evidenced by those strategies.36  Notwithstanding those reservations, I 
entirely agree with Professor Alford that they demonstrate the increasing relevance and 
power of international law.  Both Argentina and the United States have made, in the 
investment treaty between them and in the ICSID Convention, commitments enforceable 
at international law.  The punishment for not abiding by those commitments or meeting 
 
31. On umbrella clauses generally, see MONIQUE SASSON, SUBSTANTIVE LAW IN INVESTMENT TREATY 
ARBITRATION:  THE UNSETTLED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LAW 
173-94 (2010). 
32. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMs 
Agreement]. 
33. Bjorklund, State Immunity, supra note 18, at 321. 
34. See generally Alford, supra note 3. 
35. Alford, supra note 3, at 53. 
36. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State 
Arbitral Awards:  The Re-politicization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 211 (2010). 
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conditions for favorable treatment is part and parcel of a complex regime of interlocking 
obligations.  By using sanctions available outside the investment arena, the United 
States has shown its willingness to protect U.S. persons and to hold Argentina to its 
obligations.   
These tactics raise a question about whether and when it is appropriate for the United 
States to intervene in an investment dispute brought by a U.S. investor.  The ICSID 
Convention specifies that a state must suspend diplomatic protection during the 
pendency of ICSID Convention proceedings, but it also clearly dictates that if a state fails 
to pay an award, the home state of the investor can assert diplomatic protection or bring 
an international claim for non-payment of the award.37 In the Argentine context, given 
Argentina’s non-payment of awards, the United States is not violating any obligation 
under the ICSID Convention.  Should a state act prior to the resolution of the investor-
state dispute, the potential impropriety of the act would arise.38 
Here, though, and I regret closing on a pessimistic note – I wish I could be as sanguine 
about the power of international law as Professor Alford. On one view, the United States’ 
retaliation against Argentina reflects more of a return to power politics rather than 
judicially sanctioned dispute settlement.  The United States can influence Argentina 
because of its relatively strong economic power.  No dispute settlement body authorized 
the United States to suspend GSP as to Argentina.  Even if it had – even this were a 
retaliation under Article 21.5 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding39 – experience 
suggests that powerful states have greater leverage against less powerful states than the 
other way round, notwithstanding creative cross-sectoral retaliation in the WTO context.  
There is some danger that convergence in the trade and investment regimes simply 
exacerbates the already existing imbalance between powerful and less powerful actors in 
the international regime. 
  
 
37. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States art. 27(1), Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 176. 
38. For non-ICSID Convention disputes query whether there is an implied obligation to suspend 
home-state-initiated related proceedings during the pendency of the dispute. 
39. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art 21.5, Apr. 
15, 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401. 
